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he rise of new powers and attendant shifts in the global balance of 
power have led to calls for UN Security Council reform. 
Established powers have often responded by linking increased influence in the 
international system with the assumption of more international responsibility 
by aspirant powers. Based on ethical and philosophical approaches to the 
notion of responsibility, and their transposition to the state and thus 
international level, from IR theory, as well as a brief analysis of an emerging 
power —Brazil's — engagement with the concept, this article analyses the way 
in which the notion of responsibility is discursively constructed, demonstrating 
the manner in which it has been used as an ever-shifting goalpost to deny 
emerging powers participation at the highest levels of global strategic decision 
making. Most often, this is done by equating 'responsibility' with the ability and 
willingness to use robust military force. However, these practices are at odds 
with the traditions and capabilities of many important emerging powers, whose 
strengths in contributing to international order lie elsewhere. This article lays 
out a conceptual approach for delving into the ethical, moral and philosophical 
foundations of the notion of international responsibility, with emphasis on 
application to the case of Brazil. 
The article begins with how philosophy and ethics have dealt with the 
notion of responsibility, from Nietzsche to Levinas and Sartre. These origins are 
then progressively brought to bear on the discourse on international moral 
responsibility of states — not to be confused with the principle of state legal 
responsibility. The second section looks at how the transition from an 
individually-based concept to one applying to states is made, by means of the 
individuation of states. The emphasis is on remedial responsibility for others 
and its linked to both material capacity and common belonging to a 
cosmopolitan community. 
Once the analysis is situated at the level of the state, the discussion then 
approaches the difference between the often-enshrined great power special 
systemic responsibility and how the notion of responsibility relates to emerging 
powers' quest for more influence. In this sense, the objective is to illustrate how 
responsibility — once derived from capabilities — has become constitutive in 
its own right of a social role attached to privilege and influence in the 
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international system. This is then illustrated through the extensive engagement 
of a prominent emerging power — Brazil — with intervention norms and their 
attendant focus on remedial responsibility.  
 
The origins of responsibility 
Responsibility, as an ethical concept, refers to an individual action that 
presents two main characteristics: 'attributive' and 'relational'. As a relational 
concept, responsibility refers to the fact that in every responsible action, one 
can identify the relationship between the 'self' (that performs the action) and an 
'other' (that is the cause of the action). The attributive characteristic of 
responsibility is explained by the fact that to every human being can be assigned 
the capability of being responsible for someone or something. So, this person is 
inherently capable of performing (or not) an action morally significant to 
another human being. In performing or failing to perform such a moral action, 
the individual can be both praised and blamed; in this sense, responsibility is 
also a consequentialist concept.  
These two main characteristics (attributive and relational) guide the 
following reflection about the philosophical origins of responsibility, and how 
moral solicitude to the other, as a human being, guides policies in international 
relations. The discussion will first touch upon responsibility as a moral 
condition, understood as a duty to the other's needs; and second, as an 
attributive concept, guiding individuals' behavior in society.  
Responsibility, as an ethical concept, refers to human relations that 
seek to make a choice between what is considered good and evil. Every day, 
humans face these choices in dealing with others' lives. Although individuals can 
be praised or blamed for what they do (or do not do) in a particular situation, 
the very fact that they have done something (or not) is what matters to be 
considered responsible or irresponsible. As Aristotle first argued, a person's 
responsibility is explained by her capacity of making a choice (ARISTOTLE, 
1985, p. 66). But what really motivates such morally responsible actions? 
Responsibility is, as mentioned before, a 'relational' concept because it 
involves relations between human beings – those that perform responsible 
actions, and those who are the cause of these actions. According to Levinas 
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(1991),"[r]esponsibility is being for the other" (LEVINAS, 1991, p. 10). In this 
sense, being responsible for the other means to be hostage to the other: what 
matters for Levinas is not the action performed by one actor, but the main fact 
that she was capable of recognizing the other's needs (RAFFOUL, 2010, p. 163). 
According to Raffoul (2010), in order to understand Levinas' (1991)  
ethics of responsibility, one must transcend ontology; for Levinas (1991), ethics 
is thereby situated in the relationship to the other person, in intersubjectivity – 
as put by Levinas (1991), it takes place on a level 'beyond being'. This ethical 
thought places Levinas (1991) in opposition to the traditional and privileged 
ontology in Western philosophy. For Levinas (1991), Western philosophy is a 
"reduction of the 'other' to the same":  
 
a. "philosophy of power, ontology is, as first philosophy which does 
not call into question the same, a philosophy of injustice"…"Western 
Philosophy has most often been an ontology: a reduction of the other 
to the same by interposition of a middle and neutral term that 
ensures the comprehension of being"… "Being before the existent, 
ontology before metaphysics, is freedom before justice" (LEVINAS, 
1991, p. 47). 
 
It is noteworthy that as the needs of the 'other' are what really matters 
in the action of the self, the relationship between them is the primary subject. 
According to Levinas (2011), language is the instrument through which one 
being exists vis-à-vis another – it is the only way to exist outside one's inner 
existence. When the self is manifested to the other through language and the 
other engages in the same action, then one exists for the other and they can 
develop some kind of relationship. It is in this moment when the independence 
of the being is "lost, unrecognized and oppressed' that one becomes responsible 
for another because the 'center of gravitation of a being is now, outside that 
being'. The 'I', lives to attend and to serve the necessities of the 'Other'" 
(LEVINAS, 1991, p. 182-183).  
Thus, recognition of the other as one who needs to be attended to is 
what defines responsibility as a human relation. Responsibility must not be 
considered as a selfish relation where the only one that matters is the performer 
of the action, but as a relation between humans that care for one another. When 
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the other is not taken into account, and the self ignores or refuses to attend their 
necessities, this is what Levinas (1991) calls 'murder': 
 
Murder alone lays claim to total negation. Negation by labor 
and usage, like negation by representation, effect a grasp or a 
comprehension, rest on or aim at affirmation; they can. To kill is not 
to dominate but to annihilate; it is to renounce comprehension 
absolutely. Murder exercises a power over what escapes power. It is 
still a power, for the face expresses itself in the sensible, but already 
impotency, because the face rends the sensible. The alterity that is 
expressed in the face provides the unique 'matter' possible for total 
negation. I can wish to kill only an existent absolutely independent, 
which exceeds my powers infinitely, and therefore does not oppose 
them but paralyzes the very power of power. The Other is the sole 
being I can wish to kill (LEVINAS, 1991, p. 198). 
 
Responsibility to the 'other' also became a preoccupation with the 
perception of the other's needs. Furthermore, being responsible for the other is 
a virtue that must also be applied in life in society. Living in society means that 
every citizen should feel responsible for her peers. According to Sartre (1943), 
"man being condemned to be free carries the weight of the whole world on his 
shoulders; he is responsible for the world and for himself as a way of being" 
(SARTRE, 1943, p. 553). Once Man lives in the world, he is part of this world and 
must be responsible for whatever he does that may change himself or the world.  
Sartre (1943) specifically defines responsibility "in its ordinary sense as 
consciousness of being the incontestable author of an event or of an object " 
(SARTRE, 1943, p. 553). This concept implies that Sartre (1943) is still relaying 
on the traditional sense of responsibility; nevertheless, it is noteworthy that the 
idea of authorship that Sartre (1943) stresses is different from the notion of 
responsibility as accountability. According to François Raffoul (2010), " Sartre's 
philosophy retrieves existential origins of responsibility that are distinct from 
mere authorship an agent-subject" (RAFFOUL, 2010, p. 123). Responsibility 
arises out of that event named 'the death of God', and Sartre (1943) "attempts to 
draw the most radical consequence of this event, explaining that by 
existentialism" (RAFFOUL, 2010, p. 123). It means that if God does not exist, 
people should face all the consequences of their acts, and neither values nor 
actions are transcendental. 
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The issue raised by Sartre's (1943) argument is that, although 
responsibility is not understood as accountability, it brings out the need for the 
capacity to carry out a responsible action in society. To assign the characteristic 
of being responsible or irresponsible to an individual is to make a moral 
judgment. This means that, when calling someone irresponsible, one is not 
criticizing one specific act they had committed, but a history of repeated such 
acts. Similarly, when someone is called 'responsible' this means that that person 
has a history of successfully accomplishing tasks, and so it is a positive 
evaluation of their character. Williams (2008) suggests that when 
'irresponsible' and 'responsible' are used in this way, what we have in mind is 
"responsibility as a moral virtue" (WILLIAMS, 2008, pp. 456-457). 
It could be argued that if someone is responsible, she has the power or 
the ability to perform some kind of action; this means that this person is capable 
of doing what she has or intends to do (this is of tantamount relevance as well 
when transposed to the state level; see below). As Sartre (1943) argues, if 
someone is called to respond to some situation in the world, this person needs 
to possess the capacity to perform that action, whether this ability is, physical, 
material, mental, psychological or virtuous. If someone has the power to do 
something (or the ability), it is this person's duty to perform it.  
According to Sartre (1943), responsibility means to respond to an event 
that happens in the world. The very fact that a person is free — or not — to do 
something for another person makes her the owner and responsible for her own 
actions. In this sense, responding to the new demands of the humanitarian 
crises is a way of being responsible in Sartre (1943) terms because it is when 
one actor assumes that he has the capacity of being responsible. 
 Facing the new challenges in the humanitarian field, new standards for 
protecting human rights were developed. Nowadays, human rights are an 
important part of international law as they are a central subject and matter of 
responsibility for international relations (ICISS, 2001, p. 06). Dealing with the 
new challenges in human rights is a responsibility of every individual, defining a 
human being that lives in society. Despite all the biological terms that define 
human existence, being responsible for what happens in the world is what 
makes us human.  
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As discussed previously, responsibility is a concept that presents two 
main characteristics: relational, since the main concern is the other's welfare 
and needs (exemplified by Levinas (1991) argument on responsibility); and 
attributive, since it infers that being responsible, means to have the capacity for 
acting accordingly (as Sartre (1943) points it). But one question remains 
unanswered: how is responsibility to be legitimated? 
Nietzsche (2002) believed that to understand the concept of 
responsibility as a causa sui, is a matter of pride and arrogance. The author 
presented the concept of causa sui in the following way: "The causa sui is the 
best self-contradiction that has ever been conceived, a type of logical rape and 
abomination " (NIETZSCHE, 2002, p. 21). The belief in the causa sui as an origin 
of responsibility is the same as the belief in the fact that man is responsible for 
his own actions, as if owning them.  
The causa sui is what confers rationality to human beings; what makes 
humans closer to God. In this sense, Nietzsche (2002) argues that the history of 
responsibility is a lie – a false history, as put by the author – once it is built upon 
the rationalization of the human being. We can also consider that responsibility, 
as a concept, does not exist, and the very notion of human agency is formulated 
trough linguistic constructions: 
 
We have seen how it is originally language which works on 
the construction of concepts, a labor taken over in later ages by 
science. Just as the bee simultaneously constructs cells and fills them 
with honey, so science works unceasingly on this great columbarium 
of concepts, the graveyard of perceptions. It is always building new, 
higher stories and shoring up, cleaning, and renovating the old cells; 
above all, it takes pains to fill up this monstrously towering 
framework and to arrange therein the entire empirical world, which 
is to say, the anthropomorphic world. Whereas the man of action 
binds his life to reason and its concepts so that he will not be swept 
away and lost, the scientific investigator builds his hut right next to 
the tower of science so that he will be able to work on it and to find 
shelter for himself beneath those bulwarks which presently exist. 
And he requires shelter, for there are frightful powers which 
continuously break in upon him, powers which oppose scientific 
truth with completely different kinds of 'truths' which bear on their 
shields the most varied sorts of emblems (NIETZSCHE, 1873, p. 1). 
 
The effect of language is extremely important to understand the 
assembly of the concept of responsibility. The act of building concepts and 
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language is a linguistic phenomenon, or in other words, it is a psychosocial 
material production. The word is the copy in sound of a nerve stimulus; 
however, it is noteworthy that not every nerve stimulation produces a word. 
The transfer process of the nervous stimulation of sound is arbitrary, so we 
cannot say that there is a natural conception of responsibility: 
 
But when the same image has been generated millions of 
times and has been handed down for many generations and finally 
appears on the same occasion every time for all mankind, then it 
acquires at last the same meaning for men it would have if it were the 
sole necessary image and if the relationship of the original nerve 
stimulus to the generated image were a strictly causal one. In the 
same manner, an eternally repeated dream would certainly be felt 
and judged to be reality. But the hardening and congealing of a 
metaphor guarantees absolutely nothing concerning its necessity and 
exclusive justification (NIETZSCHE, 1873 p. 1). 
 
As pointed out by Nietzsche (1873), the meaning of a concept must 
change as interests change. The same can be applied to the new justification for 
international intervention, which lies in the responsibility to protect people 
from atrocities, wars and genocide, for example. As a concept, the responsibility 
to protect is 'false' because it has no inner significance, but only reflects a 
language phenomenon or a psychosocial material production that has the 
objective of legitimating an action (intervention). The importance of language as 
a way to legitimate intervention is present in the following passage of the ICISS 
Report (ICISS, 2001): 
  
[t]he traditional language of the sovereignty–intervention debate – in 
terms of 'the right of humanitarian intervention' or the 'right to 
intervene' – is unhelpful in at least three key respects. First, it 
necessarily focuses attention on the claims, rights and prerogatives of 
the potentially intervening states much more so than on the urgent 
needs of the potential beneficiaries of the action. Secondly, by 
focusing narrowly on the act of intervention, the traditional language 
does not adequately take into account the need for either prior 
preventive effort or subsequent follow-up assistance, both of which 
have been too often neglected in practice. And thirdly, although this 
point should not be overstated, the familiar language does effectively 
operate to trump sovereignty with intervention at the outset of the 
debate: it loads the dice in favor of intervention before the argument 
has even begun, by tending to label and delegitimize dissent as anti-
humanitarian (ICISS, 2001, paragraph 02, p.28). 
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It could also be argued that as a linguistic phenomenon, the idea of 
'being responsible' for the 'others' is a way of constructing the idea that 
someone is capable of doing so. In this sense, if someone claims for himself the 
capacity of attending the other's needs, it means that this person is putting 
herself in a different position from the others; it means that she has the 
capacities to perform a responsible action, whether this ability is physical, 
mental, psychological, material or else. 
The term 'responsibility' has distinct philosophical origins. Whilst some 
of the aforementioned authors describe responsibility as a capacity of living in 
the world, or understand that the real meaning of being responsible is to be 
'available' to respond to the other's needs, we can conclude that the bond 
between human beings is always the central theme of debate. We could infer 
that one of the aspects that distinguish human beings from other animals is 
their capacity of 'being responsible', or the mere understanding that 
responsibility is a subject that needs to be explored in the field of human 
relations. 
Although responsibility has been discussed here in the individual level, 
or as a human characteristic, Williams (2008), argues that, "responsibility is one 
of the central virtues of modern liberal societies. It is a virtue that we demand of 
both people and organizations—speaking of socially responsible corporations, 
managerial responsibility, individual responsibility and so forth" (WILLIAMS, 
2008, p. 03). Thereby, in the following, we discuss how the philosophical origins 
of responsibility, as a concern with the needs of the other and as a condition to 
life in society, can be transposed from the individual level to that of the state, 
thus acquiring explanatory power in the area of international politics in general, 
and particularly in intervention and emerging (non-defining) powers' 
participation therein.  
 
Bridging the gap: individual and state responsibility 
While 'responsibility talk' (BUKOVANSKY et al., 2012, p. 01) has long 
been a common feature in diplomatic and political practice, and a recurring but 
insufficiently theorized one in the academic literature, little has been done to 
develop a systematic definition of the concept as it applies specifically to state 
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conduct. Indeed, the existing literature focuses directly on the concept and its 
origins tending — as does the present analysis — to approach the subject based 
on traits from philosophy and ethics whose primary application is to the 
conduct of individuals. Bukovansky et al. (2012)  provide theoretical depth to 
this "covert domestic analogy" (BUKOVANSKY et al., 2012, p. 38) by adapting 
the work of Toni Erskine (2003). The authors posit that states fulfil two 
conditions for moral agency: " the ability to discern moral requirements, and the 
capacity to act accordingly" (ERSKINE, 2003, p. 65). In order to preserve the 
boundary between state and society — and thus, by extension, between the 
international and the domestic sphere — they adopt a thicker institutional 
approach to states as moral actors.  
The domestic/international distinction is crucial particularly when the 
focus is on humanitarian intervention, in that an individual's — and a state's — 
responsibility takes on divergent forms, as noted above: responsibility for 
oneself is ethically and philosophically distinct from responsibility for others. 
David Miller (2007, p. 81-85) similarly labels these two concepts of 
responsibility 'outcome responsibility' — that for an actor's own actions and 
decisions — and 'remedial responsibility': to come to the aid of those in need of 
help. Miller's (2007) focus is on national responsibility in a proposed form of 
global justice, and he also establishes the notion with reference to the 
individual, as a form of collective responsibility in which individuals share the 
duty. The two archetypes are clearly different in how they relate to actions and 
consequences: whereas outcome responsibility largely refers to an action that 
has been committed; remedial responsibility applies to a situation that demands 
future action — which should be assigned to a specific actor. Miller (2007) 
distinguishes between the identification of a situation involving responsibility, 
and the assignment of responsibility to a specific actor, with the purpose of 
changing the situation. Outcome responsibility is a necessary prerequisite for 
moral responsibility in relation to a given situation, but the reverse is not 
necessarily the case, as the holder of moral responsibility may not have directly 
committed the action (MILLER, 2007, p. 89). 
In the case of humanitarian intervention and concepts such as the 
"responsibility to protect" (ICISS, 2001) remedial responsibility and how it is 
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assigned that become important; in particular how (following which criteria) it 
might be assigned to specific actors. Leaving aside momentarily the key 
question of 'by whom' this responsibility might be assigned — crucial in the 
application of any concept of responsibility to emerging powers in the 
international system — this analysis makes use of the six possible modes by 
which an actor might be assigned remedial responsibility in a given situation. 
These are: 
 
Moral Responsibility: The agent who is remedially responsible for 
P's condition is the agent who is morally responsible for bringing it 
about … (ICISS, 2001, pp. 100). 
Outcome Responsibility: 'A' can be outcome responsible for P's 
condition without being morally responsible for it. … When we act as 
free agents among other free agents, we expect to keep the benefits 
that result from our actions, and so we should also expect, in general, 
to bear the costs. … But if the costs [to others] are heavy—then 
remedial responsibilities cut in, and, other things being equal, they 
fall to the agent who was outcome responsible (ICISS, 2001, pp. 100-
101).  
Causal Responsibility: This category essentially consists of outcome 
responsibility without intentionality and can obtain when there is a 
need to assign remedial responsibility (ICISS, 2001, pp. 101-102) . 
Benefit: Remedial responsibility is assigned to those who without 
causality have benefitted from another's action upon a given actor 
(ICISS, 2001, pp. 102-103).  
Capacity: Remedial responsibility falls to an initially uninvolved 
actor who has the capacity to bring relief to those in need; this is 
tempered by the notion that the cost to that actor should not be 
unduly high (ICISS, 2001, pp. 103-104). 
Community: Ties of community can be used to confer remedial 
responsibility upon any actor at a given situation (ICISS, 2001, pp. 
104).  
 
Of these, the mainstream international relations literature has focused 
mostly on capacity as a factor for the attribution of responsibility and its 
attendant social roles. Indeed, these social roles establish responsibility as a 
correlate of power (a connection that will be discussed below); in this sense the 
connection between responsibility and material capacity is a foundational 
aspect of realist thought. Through cosmopolitanism and the advance of human 
rights, and in its conceptual form through the English School (BULL, 1977), 
community bonds have also made significant inroads into analytical IR's 
conception of (remedial) responsibility. Material capacity has historically been 
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seen as the preponderant determinant of responsibility and the privileged social 
roles that pertain to it. The following section will bring this conclusion to bear 
with respect to central aspects of International Relations theory.  
 
Great powers and responsibility: material capacity 
Great powers' responsibility for the maintenance of the global system 
has been a part of the conceptualization of international order since at least the 
time of the Concert of Europe. Bukovansky et al. (2012) have placed the notion 
of 'special responsibilities' for great powers in the context of the need to 
mediate between sovereign equality and the unequal distribution of (mostly 
material) capabilities among actors in the international system (BUKOVANSKY 
et al., 2012, pp. 26-27). From Inis Claude to Raymond Aron to Hedley Bull 
(1977), influential IR theories have recognized the centrality of major actors in 
the successful maintenance of international order. Robert Jackson (2003) builds 
on Hedley Bull’s (1977) conception of great powers' 'managerial role': 
 
In the current practice of world politics, according to Bull, 
great powers perform a managerial role and for that purpose they 
enjoy special rights and duties which are generally recognized and 
acknowledged by international society. Great powers are responsible 
for 'determining issues that affect the peace and security of the 
international system as a whole'. That means they have a duty to 
shape and adjust their own foreign policies with those desirable 
international conditions firmly in view. It also means they can 
legitimately be criticized for failing in that responsibility (JACKSON, 
2003, p. 375). 
 
This becomes particularly crucial in the case of leadership within 
international organizations; the questions of causality and the linkage of 
capacity and responsibility were fundamental to the institutional design of the 
United Nations: 
 
…these debates rested on various assumptions about what it was that 
made the great powers special, and what in particular it then was 
that gave rise to their resulting responsibilities. In effect, these 
amounted to a conflation of a number of slightly different arguments: 
that the specialness of the great powers derived from their part in 
the victory in the recent war; from the sacrifices that they had made 
in effecting this outcome; and, finally, also from their capacity to 
manage the future international order in conformity with the Charter 
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design. In whichever precise form, however, what made the great 
powers special was their aggregate capacity to act on behalf of the 
new organization.  
It was precisely this linkage between capability and 
responsibility that was considered so central in the provisions 
specifically pertaining to the Security Council. Britain's Dumbarton 
Oaks paper accordingly suggested that 'the more power and 
responsibility can be made to correspond, the more likely it is that 
the machinery will be able to fulfil its functions' (BUKOVANSKY et al., 
2012, p. 31). 
 
For the authors, what unifies the various claims to attribute remedial 
responsibility to those with greater material capabilities is the ability, 
prominent in Michael Walzer's (1995) work, to act as "agents of last resort" 
(BUKOVANSKY et al., 2012, p. 41; WALZER, 1995). A conceptual thread runs 
throughout influential systemic theories in IR that holds, similarly to Miller's 
notion of capacity responsibility above, that "special responsibilities fall to the 
materially powerful, not necessarily because they have any greater 
responsibility for causing the problem, nor any greater moral responsibility for 
redressing it, but rather as "default agents simply because they alone enjoy the 
capabilities and conditions necessary to act " (BUKOVANSKY et al., 2012, p. 41.) 
One crucial aspect of the attribution of capacity-based remedial 
responsibility to great powers has been its consistent limitation to security-
related issues of global order. This goes hand in hand with the heightened status 
accorded to security issues by diplomatic practice and mainstream analysis 
(BUKOVANSKY et al., 2012, p. 47; see also BUZAN et al., 1998) and it has 
persisted in the face of efforts to broaden and deepen the applicability of 
security logic to political issues (KRAUSE AND WILLIAMS, 1996).  
In United Nations practice regarding collective security and conflict 
resolution, this has placed an increasing premium on military capacity and 
rendered difficult the connection between notions of great power answerability 
and non-security issues such as development1. Within the current context of a 
redistribution of influence within the international system and the rise of a 
consistent category of emerging powers whose strengths lie in development 
                                                 
1 This persists despite increasing recognition of the security-development nexus; the 
failure of Western operations to attain peacebuilding aims is not infrequently 
attributed to excessive attention to security elements to the detriment of 
socioeconomic development.  
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and not in security, this places the notion of responsibility squarely at the centre 
of debates over the future of the international system.  
 
Emerging powers and responsibility: social roles 
Linking capabilities and responsibility is innately tied to platforms of 
analysis, such as realism, that place a premium on material variables and on 
great power conduct in a systemic context. To bring the applicability of the 
notion of responsibility to other actors in the system, in particular to emerging 
powers, whose systemic identity is in flux, constructivist theory has key 
contributions to offer. To date, research into responsibility in this vein has 
coalesced perhaps most fruitfully around the idea of foreign policy roles and 
how they are constituted. These findings are crucial to the interpretation that 
informs much emerging power thinking about the responsibility as a role - (and 
influence) - defining discourse in international politics.  
Bukovansky et al. (2012, pp. 27-32) couch the emergence of special 
responsibilities in the need to mediate between juridical sovereign equality and 
political material inequality. Special responsibilities in the (remedial) 
maintenance of international order are assigned to the most capable powers in 
the system. With these special responsibilities are granted special rights within 
the system, inter alia in the form of (often institutionalized) heightened 
influence over collective systemic decision-making. Over time, these special 
rights came equally to define great power status, but remained notionally 
derived from the greater responsibility certain actors were able to exercise in 
the name of remedial responsibility for vulnerable elements in the system. The 
social role (see BUKOVANSKY et al., 2012, p. 62; WENDT, 1994, 1999) of 'great 
power' came to be based on the commitment to exercising remedial 
responsibility — and enjoy the rights this responsibility conferred.  
In other words, whereas the relationship between the rights and 
responsibilities of great powers — or major players — gradually inverted, the 
notion of responsibility retained a key gatekeeping quality over this status. 
Aspirants to global status were held to demonstrate both the means required 
for capacity-based remedial responsibility, and the intention to exercise it 
following the great powers' social roles. Therefore, responsibility has become a 
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key discursive prerequisite for accessing greater global influence, and the 
demonstration of such responsibility remains subjected to definitions created 
by the extent powers. Bukovansky et al. (2012) contribute substantively to the 
understanding of how this threshold is upheld with their distinction between 
universal and particular special responsibilities, which clarifies the extent to 
which the group of great powers can and cannot be auto-defined:  
 
Special responsibilities come in two forms. The first is what 
we might term 'universal' special responsibilities. Here the sub-
group of actors who bear these responsibilities is, at least 
theoretically, an open category, such as great powers or developed 
states. The particular actors that populate these categories are not 
pre-ordained; membership may vary, and any actors who satisfy the 
relevant criteria (such as 'greatness' or 'developed') can claim, or be 
allocated, the attendant special responsibilities. … The second type of 
special responsibilities are 'non-universal', in the sense that the sub-
group in question is not an open category. Only actors with certain 
integral characteristics are included; characteristics which other 
actors may admire, but which they cannot acquire or develop. … The 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) provides another example… 
Under the treaty, the category of nuclear weapons states (NWSs) is 
non-universal. Even if a state manages to acquire nuclear weapons, it 
cannot enter the select club of NWSs under the treaty: this is a closed 
category (BUKOVANSKY et al., 2012, pp. 58-59).  
 
This distinction renders clear that the discursive constitution of a state 
as a great power — and the enjoyment of the rights and privileges accruing to 
that status, is in fact far more subjective than the simple possession of material 
remedial capacity: responsibility is a concept used by established great powers 
to control access to the highest echelons of the international system2. One form 
of doing so is to couple the mere possession of capacity with the endorsement of 
norms — such as the responsibility to protect — largely defined by established 
Western powers governing its exercise. Thus whereas given emerging powers 
may possess the capacity to act remedially, as well as the normative 
commitment to do so, they may balk at subjecting this commitment to specific 
norms that clash with their own traditions. In the case of the most prominent 
current example of contribution to global governance — humanitarian 
intervention — this normative clash finds its clearest expression in 
                                                 
2 This is not dissimilar to the 'concert effect' described in Bosco, 2009.  
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disagreements over the morality and utility of the use of military force for 
remedial ends. 
 
Responsibility and the use of force 
Remedial responsibility based on capacity grants special rights upon 
those tasked to carry it out. This is expressed in the role of the Security Council 
in the United Nations Charter and it grounds the logic behind the exception 
granted in Article 2.7 of the Charter: that the principle of sovereign inviolability 
is not immune to actions taken by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the 
Charter, which is designed to cover active breaches of international peace and 
security. In practice, this has enshrined military capacity and the use of force — 
in the name of Council actions to maintain international peace and security — as 
the prime measure of international responsibility.  
By extension, possessing the capacity to use force, and placing it at the 
disposal of collective decisions oriented by principles such as the responsibility 
to protect (R2P) have become the primary — perhaps the only permitted — 
course towards obtaining the rights and privileges that accrue to major players 
in the international system (JONES et al., 2009, p. 27). Barring disproportionate 
expenditure on military means and the abandonment of historically grounded 
local cognitive priors (ACHARYA, 2009), aspirant powers remain ineligible even 
for consideration to be included in the group of leading powers represented 
most prominently by permanent membership in the UN Security Council.  
Currently, a key element determining the relationship between 
influence, responsibility and the use of military is the concept of the 
responsibility to protect, (R2P) developed by the International Commission on 
Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) in 2001. Put succinctly, R2P 
consolidates extant international law and state practice to demonstrate that 
individual rights have, in fact, always been a key component of state 
sovereignty. This differs from views in regions such as South America and 
Southeast Asia with place states' rights (such as the inviolability of borders) in 
opposition to human rights and individuals' concerns. Almost all United Nations 
member states — including Brazil, which has played an active role in 
subsequent debates on the concept (KENKEL, 2012; KENKEL AND STEFAN,  
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forthcoming) — have actively endorsed the concept and worked towards its 
operationalization. The essence of R2P is to subordinate a state's right to the 
protections of external sovereignty (non-intervention) to its respect of the 
internal contract between state and citizen and the provision of basic rights. 
When a state cannot or will not exercise this (primary) responsibility a vestigial 
(in the terms of the present analysis, remedial) responsibility falls to the 
international community.  
R2P was endorsed by world leaders in the 2005 World Summit 
Outcome Document, whose paragraphs 138 and 139 limited the concept's 
application to the four crimes of genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes and 
crimes against humanity. Among other related specifications3, a key definition 
of R2P's guidelines for application was established by the UN Secretary General 
in his Implementation Report for R2P in 2009. It established three 'pillars', 
which enshrined the notion that primary responsibility was with the affected 
state; that other states should assist that state in building capacities to fulfil its 
responsibilities towards its citizens; and that force could be used as a last resort. 
This last pillar has generated almost all of the subsequent debate on R2P both 
within and outside the United Nations, and the use of force has become a central 
issue in the conversation regarding the legitimacy or R2P in the wake of the 
Libyan intervention in 2011. R2P is a very clear statement of remedial 
responsibility, and given its explicit sanction of the use of force, its rise has 
contributed fundamentally to creating the link between influence, 
responsibility, and the propensity to use military means.  
The utility of force in conflict resolution is a prominent issue of 
contention between putatively universal norms such as the R2P and, for 
example, South Asian and South American regional security cultures that 
strongly value the pacific resolution of disputes and the 'good fences, good 
neighbours' reasoning behind non-intervention. Brazil and India, for example, 
have strongly contested the utility of force, from their reactions to the World 
Summit Outcome Document to the NATO operation in Libya in 2011 (KENKEL, 
2012). Nevertheless, as the increasing prominence of Pillar III in R2P, and peace 
                                                 
3 See the documentation available at 
http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/about-rtop/core-rtop-documents. 
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enforcement overall in UN peace operations demonstrates, the disposition to 
either approve the use of force by the international community, or to commit 
oneself to its deployment, has become a fundamental prerequisite of 
membership in the self-defined group to whom special responsibility — and its 
attendant augmented rights and influence — accrue. This is most evident in the 
case of the Security Council, to which the UN Charter assigns specific rights and 
responsibilities (competences, in legal terms).  
 
Article 24 
01. In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its 
Members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the 
maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out 
its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf. 
02. In discharging these duties the Security Council shall act in accordance with 
the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations. The specific powers granted 
to the Security Council for the discharge of these duties are laid down in 
Chapters VI, VII, VIII, and XII. 
 
Article 39 
The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, 
breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or 
decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to 
maintain or restore international peace and security. 
 
Article 42 
Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 
would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action 
by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore 
international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, 
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blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the 
United Nations4. 
 
Security Council permanent membership — a close approximation of 
great power status in today's international system — thus relates to members' 
ability to contribute to the maintenance of peace and security (JONES et al., 
2009, p. 55). This raises the fundamental question of how one can measure 
capacity to contribute – as tied to remedial responsibility. Whereas, as noted 
above, established influential powers conceive this capacity as tied to a specific 
approach to sovereignty and the use of force, some emerging powers such as 
Brazil and India have a discernibly different understanding of the situation 
(JONES et al., 2009, p. 59). 
 
Brazil, responsibility, and intervention 
Given its own cognitive priors with respect to intervention (non-use of 
force; definition of sovereignty as inviolability, not responsibility; penchant for 
multilateralism as a global equalizer), Brazil's diplomatic positioning with 
respect to both specific and abstract issues related to R2P tend to challenge a 
number of the above assumptions. At the most abstract and fundamental level, 
Brazil expresses a stance — based in its case on its colonial past and its desire to 
join what has revealed itself to be a closed club of major powers — which casts 
into doubt the very notion of unfettered free will actors are postulated to 
possess in the vision of moral responsibility outlined above. K.E. Boxer (2013) 
outlines a view in which an actor's responsibility for her actions in a given 
context are sufficiently predetermined by antecedent decisions and history that 
full responsibility for their consequences must be shared between her and those 
who contributed the set of choices which determined those actions (BOXER, 
2013). Chad Lavin (2008) takes a similar approach to what he terms 'liberal 
responsibility', identifying neatly how individual and ultimately state 
responsibility in a liberal context are constructed in such a way as to constrain 
given actors within certain roles dictated by a priori conceptions. In the 
                                                 
4 It is important here to recall Jackson's (1998) distinction between political and legal 
responsibility; that which can be laid out as an interpretation of legal responsibility, 
and that which requires justification of a legal course of action (JACKSON, 1998, p. 05). 
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argumentation adopted by Brazil, India and South Africa, for example, these 
constraints take the form both of the tenets of a postcolonial legacy, and the 
current hallmarks of a liberal international order.  
Caught between the desire to attain greater influence and adherence to 
soundly grounded domestic norms, Brazil has actively sought to demonstrate its 
international responsibility — and thus attain the privileges that go with it — in 
ways that differ from those prescribed by the current practice of the established 
powers. For example, it has attempted to bring to the debate on the future 
development of R2P elements of development and prevention, while attempting 
to remove what it sees as an excessive focus on the use of force (KENKEL, 2012).  
More specifically with regard to the responsibility to protect itself, the 
advent of R2P was greeted with significant skepticism by the makers of 
Brazilian foreign policy. Brazil's resistance to the ICISS concept was based on 
three main elements: the acceptability and efficacy of the use of military force; 
the criteria of right authority (which it sought to see limited to the Security 
Council, whose own aptness was cast into question in the absence of reform to 
include Southern states and Brazil itself); and a fear, based on a deep 
historically rooted mistrust, of misuse of R2P by Western powers to cloak 
aggressive interventionism (KENKEL and STEFAN, forthcoming).  
Alongside fellow emerging power India, but distinctly from historical 
opponents of human rights advances at the UN such as Cuba, Sudan, Venezuela 
and China (BELLAMY, 2011, pp. 43ff.), Brazil opposed the taking up of 
paragraphs 138 and 139 on R2P into the 2005 World Outcome Document; the 
concept was, however, included, in a form restricted to "four crimes" of 
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity — in 
paragraphs 138 and 139 of the Document (UNITED NATIONS, 2005).  
However, growing rhetorical support for R2P at the UN, as well as its 
increasing institutionalization within the Organization — such as the 
appointment of Special Advisers to the Secretary-General for Genocide 
Prevention (2004) and R2P itself (2007) and its inclusion in Security Council 
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Resolutions, including those mandating UN peace operations5 — created a 
dilemma for Brazilian policymakers. R2P's new weight within the UN placed 
two key tenets of the country's foreign conduct at odds: its desire to be seen as 
exercising responsibility, and thus to access the privileged group of influential 
powers, and its rejection of the concrete form that responsibility was being 
given in specific circumstances.  
The public debates in the General Assembly (2005) on intervention and 
related issues that took place between the World Summit and the Libyan 
intervention show an increasing effort by Brazil's representatives to bridge this 
gap; in its most mature form this effort took the form of incorporating the 
incipient norm into Brazil's overarching foreign policy objectives6 to give the 
country increased entrepreneurship as a norm 'taker' rather than 'giver'7. 
Another prominent example of the desire to take a normative lead in aligning 
developing countries' tradition with the Northern-led intervention debate — 
and a crucial element in Brazil's drive to show responsibility without buying 
into Western-led implementation of R2P — was the principle of 'non-
indifference', a concept with origins on the African continent adapted by then-
Foreign Minister Celso Amorim (ALMEIDA, 2013; HERMANN 2011; WILLIAMS 
2007). 
This trajectory of increased participation in UN intervention debates — 
spurred by the personal interest of then-Foreign Minister Antonio de Aguiar 
Patriota, who subsequently became the country's Permanent Representative to 
                                                 
5 Prior to the issuing of the RwP concept note, these include S/RES/1653, 1674 and 
1706 (UNMIS) in 2006; 1894 in 2009; 1970, 1973 and 2016 in 2011, all on Libya; as 
well as 1978 and 1996 (2011). See Global Center for the Responsibility to Protect, 'UN 
Security Council Resolutions Referencing R2P', 15 April 2013, accessed on 09 March 
2014, http:// http://www.globalr2p.org/resources/335. 
6 On how the ensuing focus on development and root causes rather than acute military 
force has given peacebuilding practice a prominent place in Brazilian contributions to 
the debate, see Kenkel, 2013. 
7 A defining characteristic of emerging power conduct, with specific effects on how 
responsibility can be exercised, has been the desire to exercise normative leadership 
(in giving contours, inter alia, to the definition of responsibility), or at least not to be 
seen consistently as what Jeffrey Checkel and subsequently Amitav Acharya have 
termed a 'norm-taker' (Checkel, 1998, cited in Acharya, 2004) This is particularly true 
in the case of Brazil; the country has explicitly sought to exercise normative 
entrepreneurship and to stake a claim to ideational leadership in the global South and 
in its region; see Benner, 2013 and Schirm, 2010. 
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the UN in August 2013 — created the impetus that resulted in the 
'responsibility while protecting' in the wake of the Libyan intervention. 
Following the NATO intervention in Libya, Brazilian diplomacy voiced 
concerns specifically about the utility of the use of force as a means of conflict 
resolution—mostly such as doubts "that the use of force as provided for in 
paragraph 04 of the resolution will lead to the realization of our common 
objective — the immediate end to violence and the protection of civilians" 
(WILLIAMS and BELLAMY, 2012, p. 281) and that undue robustness in the 
international response might "change the home-grown nature of the rebellion 
narrative and thus endanger the chances of a stable resolution of the conflict in 
the longer term" (WILLIAMS, 2011, fn 50, p. 11). 
The most important of Brazil's responses was the issuing of the concept 
note entitled "Responsibility while protecting" (RwP) (BRAZIL, 2011) in 
November of 2011. In it, Brazilian diplomats questioned the utility of the use of 
force in resolving the root causes of conflicts. While essentially accepting the 
existence of a remedial responsibility and its concentration in (particularly the 
permanent) members of the Security Council, the note questions whether that 
responsibility need necessarily be tied to the use of force (KENKEL and DE 
ROSA, forthcoming). In addition, the note suggests tighter controls on Security 
Council action, greater standardization of decision making, and the existence of 
other means by which states reluctant to use force might contribute to 
international conflict resolution.  
Beyond the immediate concerns related to the intervention's mandate, 
RwP and the debate over the Libyan case took on contours that resonated with 
the larger tension between the established powers and emerging players such 
as the BRICS8. Substantial divergences remain over R2P's implementation and 
particularly its third pillar; interpretations of the concept of sovereignty sit at 
the centre of this debate, with emerging powers such as the BRICS interpreting 
the horizontal aspects of sovereignty as a means for states to reduce the adverse 
effect of the unequal distribution of power in the international system (CULP 
and PLAGEMANN, 2013, pp. 07-13). In this way, R2P's shift in emphasis 
                                                 
8 On the manifestation of this contestation in terms of norm diffusion, see Almustafa et 
al., 2013. 
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between understandings of sovereignty has enshrined it as a key locus for 
established powers to contest the West's normative dominance, making the 
principle a key rallying point in the ideational skirmishes resulting from a 
changing global distribution of power.  
Diplomatic and analytical reactions to the RwP note have been as mixed 
as those to the Libyan intervention itself. Typically, RwP has been greeted more 
charitably, and as a constructive contribution, in the global South, while in the 
North there was scepticism over what was perceived as open resistance to the 
political dominance of the West and its control over how contributions to 
international peace and security can be made (KENKEL and STEFAN, 
forthcoming).  
While this debate will go on for some time, it is clear that the R2P 
debate has become not only a key element of some emerging powers' challenge 
to the established distribution of powers, but a key locus for increased targeted 
consultation and cooperation in mounting that challenge. In addition, the 
intervention debates have become a key locus for emerging powers 
constructively to give normative content to their challenge to the established 
order, allowing them to move beyond what analysts such as Ramesh Thakur 
have described as obstructionist stance (THAKUR, 2011, pp. 153-159). Brazil's 
RwP initiative, whose content is synoptically presented below, is to date the 
most emphatic example of this movement, though it cannot be dealt with in 
detail in the present analysis (BRAZIL, 2011, paragraph 11). 
 In conclusion, Brazil's engagement with intervention norms illustrates 
both the importance of responsibility as a discursive practice and its 
intersubjective nature. How Brazil engages with demands to take on 
responsibility as a prerequisite to its quest for greater influence is an effective 
indicator of when it will abide by, and when it will seek to change, normative 
definitions concerning its position in the system set out by establish powers. P-5 
practice has shown that the grouping of great powers is discursively indeed a 
closed one, and that simply meeting the criteria is not sufficient. In other words, 
the definition of responsibility — as a precondition for acceptance to a 
privileged position in the international system — will continue to be modified 
as a tool to limit membership. Brazil and other powers will continue to seek 
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some form of combining their own cognitive priors — in particular a strong 
aversion to the use of military force — with elements enshrined as crucial to the 
exercise of responsibility by the institutionalization of R2P at the UN.  
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